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THE STRUCTURE OF WAR
添加时间: 2018-12-4 14:38:42 来源: 作者: 点击数:1241

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THE STRUCTURE OF WAR

THE Juxtaposition of Injured Bodies and Unanchored Issues

Torture is such an extreme event that it seems inappropriate to generalize from it to anything else or from anything else to it. Its immorality is so absolute and the pain it bring s about so real that there is a reluctance to place it in conversation by the side of other subjects. But this reluctance, and the deep sense of tact in which it originates, increase our vulnerability to power by ensuring that our moral intuitions and impulses, which come forward so readily on behalf of human sentience, do not come forward far enough to be of any help: we ear most backward on behalf of the things we believe in most in part because, like ancients hesitant to permit analogies to God, our instincts salute the incommensurability of pain by preventing its entry into worldly discourse. The result of this is that the very moral interior and inarticulate as sentience itself.

It is a consequence of the ease with which power can be mixed with almost any other subject that it can be endlessly unfolded, exfoliated, in strategies and theories that---whether compellingly legitimate or transparently absurd---in their very form, in the very fact of occurring in human speech, increase the claim of power, its representation in the world. In contrast, one of two things is true of pain. Either it remains inarticulate or else the moment it first becomes articulate it silences all else; The moment language bodies forth the reality of pain, it makes all further statements and interpretations seem ludicrous and inappropriate, as hollow as the world content that disappears in the head of the person suffering . Beside the initial fact of pain, all further elaborations---that it violates this or that human principle, that it can be objectified in this or that way, that it is amplified here, that it is disguised there–all these seem trivializations, a missing of the point a missing of the pain. But the result of this is that moment it is lifted out of the ironclad privacy of the body into speech, it immediately falls back in. Nothing sustains its image in the world; nothing alerts us to the place it has vacated. From the inarticulate it half emerges into speech and then quickly recedes once more. Invisible in part because of its resistance to language, it is also invisible because its own powerfulness ensures its isolation, ensures that it will not be seen in the context of other events, that it will fall back from its new arrival in language and remain devastating. Its absolute claim for acknowledgement contributes to its being ultimately unacknowledged.

Though there may be no human event that is as without defense as torture, others gives rise to the same central question---By what perceptual process does it come about that one human being can stand beside another human being in agonizing pain and not know it, not know it to the point where he himself inflicts it? ---and once again lead to an answer centering on interactions between the body and voice made possible by a language of agency.

The most obvious analogue to torture is war. The form of torture that leaves the prisoner untouched by the torturer but that requites prisoners to maim one another makes visible the connection between them. Some of the apparent differences between them are partially attributable to the fact that the symbolic and the fictional are much more prominent in torture. War more often arises where the enemy is external, occupies a separate space, where the impulse to obliterate a rival population and its civilization is not (or need not at first be perceived as) a self-destruction. Torture usually occurs where the enemy is internal and where the destruction of a race and its civilization would be a self–destruction, an obliteration of one’s own country. Hence there must be more drama in torture: the destruction must be acted out symbolically within a handful of rooms.

War and torture have the same two targets, a people and its civilization (or as they were called earlier, the two realms of sentience and self- extension); the much greater reliance on the symbolic in torture occurs in both spheres. In both war and torture, there is a destruction of “civilization” in its most elemental form. When Berlin is bombed, when Dresden is burned, there is a deconstruction not only of a particular ideology but of the primary evidence of the capacity for self—extension itself: one does not in bombing Berlin destroy only objects, gestures, and thoughts that are culturally stipulated but objects, gestures, and thoughts that are human, not Dresden buildings or German architecture but human shelter. Torture is a parallel act of deconstruction. It imitates the destructive power of war: rather than destroying the concrete physical fact of streets, houses, factories, and schools, it destroys them as they exist in the mind of the prisoner, it destroys them as they exist in the furnishings of a room: to convert a table into a weapon is to set a factory on fire; to hear a confession is to watch from above the explosion of a city block. This same form of substitution occurs in relation to the second target, the sentient source of the first, the human body itself. Whereas the object of war is to kill people, torture usually mimes the killing of people by inflicting pain, the sensory equivalent of death, substituting prolonged mock execution for execution. The numbers involved reinforce this sense of the division between the real and the dramatized. Although the thousands and thousands of political prisoners hurt during the 1970s and 1980s have led Amnesty International to call torture an “epidemic,” the numbers of persons hurt are of course vastly larger in war. In torture, the individual stands for “individuals” —huge multiplicity is replaced by close proximity sustained over hours or days weeks; being in close contact with the victim’s hurt provide the sense of “magnitude” achieved in war through large numbers.

But while torture relies much more heavily on overt drama than does war, war too—as is quietly registered in the language of theatres of battle, international dialogues, scenarios, and stages—has within it a large element of the symbolic and is ultimately, like torture, based on a simple and startling blend of the real and the fictional. In each, the incontestable reality of the body—the body in pain, the body maimed, the body dead and hard to dispose of—is separated from its source and conferred on an ideology or issue or instance of political authority impatient of, or deserted by, benign sources of substantiation. There is no advantage to setting an international dispute by means of war rather than by a song contest or a chess game except that in the moment when the contestants step out of the song contest, it is immediately apparent that the outcome was arrived at by a series of rules that were agreed to and that can now be disagreed to, a series of rules whose force of reality cannot survive the end of the contest because that reality was brought about by human acts of participation and is dispelled when the participation ceases. The rules of war are equally arbitrary and again depend on convention, agreement, and participation; but the legitimacy of the outcome outlives the end of the contest because so many of its participants are frozen in a permanent act of participation: that is, the winning issue or ideology achieves for a time the force and status of material “fact” by the sheer material weight of the multitudes of damaged and opened human bodies.

This brief characterization of the structure of war will be unfolded more slowly below and then differentiated from a widely accepted and erroneous account of war with which it might otherwise be confused. Gradually the parallel between what occurs in the interior of torture and what occurs in the interior of war will become visible, as will also a crucial element that differentiates them, endowing war with a moral ambiguity wholly absent from torture. It will become clear why those who wish to outlaw torture have never found it difficult to arrive at an “absolute” formulation of their prohibition, while those who with equal passion work to outlaw the initiation of war have so often stopped short of an unconditional formulation and arrived at the perception that an “absolute” prohibition may be itself morally untenable.

One simple and important formal difference will be visible from the outset .Though the two are structural analogues, the fundamental shape of each comes into being in a different place: the structure of torture resides in, takes shape in, the physical and verbal interactions between two persons, a torturer and a prisoner; the structure of war will again be centered in an extraordinary relation between body and voice but that relation will not be itself locatable within the relation between any two persons–soldier and solider, solider and officer, soldier and civilian –nor even in the relation between two large groups of people, such as the hundreds of thousands of persons who face and deface each other across the field of battle. The essential structure of war, its juxtaposition of the extreme facts of body and voice, resides in the relation between its own largest parts, the relation between the collective casualties that occur within war, and the verbal issues (freedom, national sovereignty, the right to a disputed ground, the extra-territorial authority of a particular ideology) that stand outside war, that are there before  the act of war begins and after it ends, that are understood by warring populations as the motive and justification and will again be recognized after the war as the thing substantiated or (if one is on losing side ) not substantiated by war’s activity. The central question that is asked here---what is the relation between the obsessive act of injuring and issue on behalf of which that act is performed---is a question about the relation between the interior content of war and what stands outside it. In order to answer that question, however, it is necessary to back up one step and define the relation between two interior facts about war: first, that the immediate activity is injuring; second, that the immediate activity of war is a contest, In participating in war, one participates not simply in an act of injuring, but in the activity of reciprocal injuring where the goal is to out—injure the opponent. The construction, “war is x” has, over the centuries, invited an array of predicate nominatives; but there are no two predicate nominatives that have either the accuracy or the definitional totality as the two singled out here, and it is by first understanding precisely how the two quality one another that it will be possible to arrive at an understanding of the second and more fundamental question about the relation between bodily injury and verbal issues.

Our starting place, then, is the assumption that war belongs to two larger categories of human experience (larger in the sense that each contains war as only one of its terms). First, it is a form of violence; it is a member of a class of occurrences that are contests. It is in the relation of these two rather than in either individually that the nature of war resides, but for a moment each of the two must be held steadily visible in isolation because each has a way of slipping out of view. Thus it is necessary to back up one more step and make certain that our two “self–evident premises” are indeed self-evident.

I. War Is Injuring

The main purpose and outcome of war is injuring. Though this fact is too self-evident and massive ever to be directly contested, it can be indirectly contested by many means and disappear from view along many separate paths. It may disappear from view simply by being omitted: one can read many pages of a historic or strategic account of a particular military campaign, or listen to many successive installments in a newscast narrative of events in contemporary war, without encountering the acknowledgment that the purpose of the event described is to alter (to burn, to blast, to shell, to cut) human tissue, as well as to alter the surface, shape, and deep entirety of the objects that human beings recognize as extensions of themselves is too self–evident to require articulation; it may instead originate in a failure desire to misrepresent the central content of war’s activity(and this conscious attempt to misrepresent can in its turn be broken down into an array of motives, some malevolent, some relatively benign).

The identification of the paths by which injuring disappears from view and not the identification of motive will be attended to here; for any one path is likely to be laden with many motives, and the recitation of all of them in so brief a discussion would be as impossible as the specification of one or two would be misleading. Much more important, regardless of local motives, the structure of war itself will require that eclipse by one constellation of motives or another. That is, just as torture can be understood to entail three separate steps---the infliction of pain, the objectification of the pain, the disowning of the pain and transfer of its attributes to another location---so, too, it will gradually become evident that war entails a similar structure of physical and perceptual events: it require both the reciprocal infliction of massive injury and the eventual disowning of the injury so that its attributes can be transferred elsewhere, as they cannot if they are permitted to cling to the original site of the wound, the human body.

It should also be noticed from the outset that while the perpetuation of war would be impossible without the disowning of injuring, this disowning is not necessarily authored (not at any rate exclusively authored) by those who wish to perpetuate war. Although it would not be inaccurate to say that in general the physical immediacy of damaged human bodies is more visible in the words of those working to outlaw a particular weapon, to stop a particular war, or to eliminate the universal form of war than it is in the words of those who, because of a political or military or philosophic position, are engaged in its continuation, the generalization would be one so elaborately attended by qualifications and exceptions that it would come to seem unhelpful if not untrue. The qualifications come from three directions. First, active opposition to war does not necessarily require an accurate perception or description of the relation between injuring and political goals. Second and conversely, acceptance of war, or even active sponsorship of war as occurs when a president, prime minister, or statesman must work to ensure the continued participation of his country’s population in a given conflict, may in fact be carried out (as can be seen in the political writings of Henry Kissinger and Winston Churchill, or again in the strategic writings of Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, or Sokolovskiy) with varying degrees of attention to and assessment of the centrality of the act of injuring. Third, conventional war entails the participation of a massive number of people, only a small fraction of whom are engaged in the active verbal advocacy of either the elimination or the perpetuation of war; and if injuring disappears, it is its absence in their informal conversation that is perhaps most important.

A deeply tactful, compassionate, and careful account of the alterations that occur in human tissue such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s verbal and visual account of the effects of incendiary weapons in Vietnam, Dresden, Hiroshima, or Nagasaki may place the injured body several inches in front of our eyes, hold the light up to the injured flesh, and keep steady the reader’s head so that he cannot turn away. In their attempt to bring about the elimination of such weapons(weapons may be differentiated not by whether or not they injure, nor even by the final extremity of damage since most kill, but by the intensity and duration of suffering before death), such descriptions are crucial; for although in understanding the nature of war the agonized injury of the small Vietnamese girl’s burned face and burned off arms---or later her look of terror as she sees in the reflecting surface of window, river, or imported spoon the obliteration of her features---must be multiplied over the thousands and millions of inhabitants of different countries, injury must at some point be understood individually because pain, like all forms of sentience, is experienced within, “happens ” within, the body of the individual. Such a study may not, however, specify whether such injury was the intent or accidental effect of the bombing, whether it was within or wholly outside the view of the chemist or corporation who discovered or marketed napalm, and, most important, whether the populations who consented to war consented to this or to something else.

 A much more direct account of these questions may occur in writings that endorse, or at least accept, the occurrence of war. Of all writing---political, strategic, historical, medical---- there is probably no work that more successfully holds visible the structural centrality of injuring than Clausewitz’s On War. In his description of invasion, for example, he will say, “The immediate object here is neither to conquer the enemy county nor to destroy its army, but simply to cause general damage,” as he will often elsewhere specify that the object is to “increase the enemy’s suffering.” In battle, for example, the soldier’s primary goal is not, as is so often wrongly implied, the protection or “defense” of his comrades (if it were this, he would have led those comrades to another geography): his primary purpose is the injuring of enemy soldiers; to preserve his own forces has the important but only secondary and “negative” purpose of frustrating and exhausting the opponent’s achievement of his goal. If the visibility of central fact of damage, and the specification of the particular form of damage sought in any given tactic, has wrongly contributed to Clausewitz’s reputation for “ruthlessness,” it has justly contributed to his reputation for astonishing brilliance: one knows on every page that one is the presence of a massive intelligence in part because his powers of description remain available to him at all moments. The written and spoken record of war over many centuries certifies the ease with which human powers of description break down in the presence of battle, the speed with which they back away from injuring and begin to take as their subject the most incidental or remote activities occurring there, rather than holding onto what is everywhere occurring at its center and periphery. The enumeration of the paths by which injuring disappears from view only begins with the one already named here: omission. The character of the other paths will be illustrated below with passages from formal writings; but other paths will be illustrated below with passages from formal writings; but they are most significant insofar as they are recognized as having counterparts in the informal and unrecorded conversations of the general population, as the subject of war makes its way into our daily activities and accompanies us as we walk down the road, sit down to dinner, or return a borrowed book or tool to a friend.

A second path by which injuring disappears is active redescription of the event: the act of injuring, or the tissue that is to be injured, or the weapon that is to accomplish the injury is renamed. The gantry for American missiles is named the “cherrypicker,” just as North Vietnam were called “Sherwood Forest” and” Pink Rose,” just as Japanese suicide planes in World War II were called “night blossoms,” as prisoners subjected to medical experiments in Japanese camps were called “logs,” and as the day during died at Tannenberg came to be called the “Day of Harvesting.” The recurrence here of language from the realm of vegetation occurs because tissue, though alive, is perceived to be immune to pain; thus the inflicting of damage can be registered in language without permitting the entry of the reality of suffering into the description. Live vegetable tissue occupies a peculiar category of sentience that is close to, perhaps is, nonsentience; more often, the language is drawn from the unequivocal nonsentience of steel, wood, iron, and aluminum, the metals and materials out of which weapons are made and which can be invoked so that an event entailing two deeply traumatic occurrences, the inflicting of an injury and the receiving of an injury, is thus neutralized. “Neutralization” or “neutering”(or their many various such as “cleaning,” “cleaning out ” “cleaning up” or other phrases indicating an alteration in an essential characteristic of the metal, such as “liquification”) is itself a major vocabulary invoked in the redescription of injuring. It begins by being applied only to weapons: it is the other peoples’ firepower (guns, rockets, tanks) that must be “neutralized,” but it is then transferred to the holder of the gun, the firer of the rocket, the driver of the tank, as well as to the man beings who must be (not injured or burned or dismembered or killer but) “neutralized,” “cleaning out,” “liquidated.”

Although a weapon is an extension of the human body (as is acknowledged in their collective designation as “arms”), it is instead the human body that becomes in this vocabulary an extension of the weapon. A nineteen–year–old holding a pistol has an arm that is three and a half feet from his shoulder to the tip of his weapon (if the weapon is firing, his reach changes from three and a half feet to five hundred yards).The first three feet are sentient tissue; the last half foot is nonsentient material. An idiom appropriate to an alteration in the surface of the gun’s metal is invoked to describe an alteration in the boy’s embodied arm as, conversely, an idiom originally invented to describe an unwanted alteration in the tissue of the human arm will be extended to the weapon: so an opponent will find himself in the peculiar position of working to “neutralize” the boy and to “wound” the gun. That the “wounding” language is applied to weapons and arms (that helicopter are injured in the sands of Iran; that the Sheffield receives a mortal wound in the waters off the Falkland Islands) would not in isolation be wholly inappropriate since these objects, like libraries and cities, are projections of the human person; but the language is lent to the weapons at precisely the same moment that it is being lifted away from the sentient source of those projections. The language of killing and bodies of thousands of nineteen–year–old German soldiers can be called “producing results” and the death of civilians by starvation and pestilence following an economic boycott is called collateral effects “at precisely the same time that one turns on a radio and hears the report of an arsenal of tanks that received a “massive injury” or opens a book and reads about the government‘s hope “to kill a hidden base.” Once the populations of two nations consent to devote themselves to damaging each other, the dissolution of their language may not be itself morally disastrous; it may be perceived as inevitable and perhaps even “necessary.” These different questions are neither raised nor answered here where the object is the relatively modest one of registering two facts: that reciprocal injuring is the obsessive content of war; that its centrality often slips from view.

The habit of mind that is illustrated here as occurring in representative phrases and sentence is a massive one that occurs not in isolated fragments but is formalized into a conventional mode of perceiving the events of war. The exchange of idioms between weapons and bodies has its most serious manifestation in the fact that in identified as (or described as though it were) “disarming “rather than “injuring”. Although the first term is sometimes intended only as a synonym for the second, it is at other times used explicitly to differentiate the benign activity of eliminating weapons from what is then presented as the only accidental and unfortunate entailment of human injury during those operations. Thus we repeatedly encounter descriptions of war that come astonishingly close in their expressed aversion to weapons to sounding not merely “protective” but nearly “pacifist” in intention. If this confusion has achieved monumental proportions in discussions of nuclear war, it is because our very conception of nuclear war may itself be understood as the culmination of the history of this confusion: it is appropriate that at precisely the moment when weapons are capable of unprecedented injury to the human body (three hundred million persons in the first exchange), and in fact incapable of not inflicting that massive injury (if shot down outside one’s own territory they will land in someone’s country)---it is appropriate that at precisely this moment those weapons should have names (e.g., anti-missile missile) and be consistently described in such a way that their only target, or only intended target, or only immediate target, appear to be another weapon: that their effect is to “disarm” rather than to injure. It should be understood that the coupling of the two is not an accidental and ironic conjunction but a profound manifestation of confusion with a long and rich history. In the history of thinking about war, there are probably only one or two other errors at once so persistent, pervasive and deeply wrong as this one.

   It is of course precisely because conventional war does in fact include in its interior acts of disarming (a dead soldier may be called a “disarmed” soldier even though his rifle is still functional, and in any war there may be many specific missions that have as their target the destruction of a munitions works, a tractor factory, or an Opel plant )that this particular confusion is more difficult to correct than the parallel confusion that involves importing an occurrence outside war into its interior. That is, a person who believes (perhaps quite rightly) that the outcome of a particular war will be greater political freedom for a given population may wrongly think of the interior activity of war as “freeing.” But if actually asked to look at several hundred people in a forest slipping behind trees, edging out, lifting a rifle, disappearing, reappearing, bleeding, falling, he would probably agree that the best identification of the immediate activity occurring there would not be “freeing,” but reciprocal injuring. Although the exterior occurrence may be imported into his description of the interior (he may begin by describing the activity as “oppressing” are performing a nearly identical set of gestures), it can still be clearly differentiated from and abstracted back out of what literally occurs there. But any activity that itself actually occurs in the interior of war will be much more difficult for the human mind to assess. Because disarming and injuring accompany once another inside war, it is more difficult for a person watching the men (as they still through the light and shade of the forest, all ammunition that each side knows the other has) to see which activity is central and which is the extension of that center. If the observer were to identify the central act as “injuring, “the accuracy of this identification would be confirmed by the similarity between the infliction of injuring here and any instance of it occurring outside war: it might be with a car rather than a tank ,a knife rather than a gun, down the steps rather than off a cliff, punishable as a crime or exonerated as self-defense rather than accepted as an unremarkable day’s work, but in each case a body is being damaged by another body who himself risks danger at the moment he attempts to remain immune. If the observer were instead to identify the central activity as “disarming,” he or she would discover little similarity between the immediate activity of the men in the forest and the signing of a disarmament treaty between nations, or the signing of a contract between rival residents of adjoining streets.

   It could be argued that just as the original observer could describe the immediate activity as “freeing” if he agreed to call it “freeing by injuring”(or “freeing by injuring those who are oppressing by injuring,” or “reciprocal injuring for nonreciprocal outcomes”), so the second could call the activity “disarming” if he stipulated “disarming by injuring” and thus accounted for the profound difference between what is happening here and in a disarmament contract, where it is the very absence of injury that is the motivating force and outcome. But again, unless both terms are understood as synonyms, the phrase “disarming by injuring” still misrepresents war’s activity by misidentifying injuring as the subordinate activity. The more accurate formulation of both the substance and purpose of that activity is not “to disarm by injuring” but “to out-injure by injuring and disarming.” That is, each side works to out-injure the other and does so in two ways: first, by inflicting injury on the bodies of the opponent; second, by resisting injuries to themselves both by avoiding bullets (running, ducking, diving behind trees, all of which can be called acts of disarming or rendering neutral the enemy’s weapons) and by destroying the munitions works or ammunition supplies. To say that each side in a war wishes to disarm the other only expresses the fact that each side wishes to increase its own immunity while inflicting damage on the other. This particular confusion is so fundamental that its clarification will again be required at several later points in this discussion. It is introduced here because renaming injuring “disarming” is one of many ways in which injuring is redescribed and made invisible.

The first two paths by which injuring achieves invisibility—omission and redescription—are, of course, nearly inseparable; they are manifestations of one another. Redescripition may, for example, be understood as only a more active form of omission: rather than leaving out the fact of bodily damage, that fact is itself included and actively cancelled out as it is introduced into the spoken sentence or begins to be recorded on a written page. Alternatively, omission may be understood as only the most successful or extreme form of redescription where the fact of injury is now so successfully enfolded within the language that we cannot even sense its presence beneath the surface of that language, or point to the phrase or clause where (as in redescription) it has almost surfaced and then been held in place once more. The difficulty of distinguishing the two can be illustrated by a particular formal convention that occurs within the genes of strategy writing.

With the exception of periodic body counts or “kill ratios,” the intricacies and complications of the massive geographical interactions between two armies of opposing nations tend to be represented without frequent reference to the actual injuries occurring to the hundreds of thousands of soldiers involved: the movements and actions of the armies are emptied of human content and occur as a rarefied choreography of disembodied events. But the quality of abstraction and, above all, the apparent distance of these events from the realm of human pain cannot in any simple way be attributed to the categorical evacuation of the body from the text; for the body, exiled in its ordinary form, is allowed to reenter in an only slightly unexpected place. Each of the two armies periodically becomes a single embodied combatant, with the real human body’s elemental duality of being at once capable of inflicting injury and of receiving it. The ordinary five to six foot vertical expanse of the adult person now becomes a colossus with, for example, one foot in Italy, another in northern Africa, a head in Sweden, an arm pulling back toward the coast of France, then suddenly punching forward toward German. The crossing of a river is not now an event enacted by many individuals ---some of whom know how to swim and others of whom do not, some vulnerable to wet and cold and some relatively immune, some who have as their worst dream being caught between two banks on a bridge and others who have waited for just this moment of trial----but is rather enacted by a single integrated creature who, if named, takes the name of the division or of the commander, and who steps across in a single step ,as when Omar Bradley writes, “Simpson had previously complained of Monty’s orders halting him on the west bank of the Rhine when he could have jumped across it against light opposition,” or, similarly, “In stalking us through the Ardennes, the enemy had been forced to expose himself to our fire, especially to the murderous air burst of our proximity fuse. To the 4th Division still nursing its wounds from the Huertgen Forest, this reversal in roles brought a sardonic satisfaction.” If such descriptions were sustained over pages or even whole paragraphs, the text would become a mythology of giants lumbering across rivers and stalking through forests, but of course the text only periodically and momentarily breaks out of abstraction into this form of description.

  It is precisely because this form of description is a widely shared convention that it need not often be sustained over an entire passage but can instead be invoked with a single word or phrase, the fragments of a story whose outlines are familiar to all. Thus, one’s own army may become a single gigantic weapon, a “spearhead” or a “hammer”; a certain territory or part of the army may become an “appendix” or an “underbelly”; each army has an “Achilles heel” or a vulnerable “hinge” or “joint” or a “rear” that may be “penetrated”; two divisions may be attacked where they stand “shoulder to shoulder,” and so forth. Although a shared convention rather than a construction introduced by a single writer, some are more masters of it than others. It is used, for example, with great frequency and agility by B. H. Liddell Hart, Ludendorff’s “long-cherished idea of a decisive blow against the British in Belgium” in World War I becomes a blow that will be delivered or not delivered with his own magnified hands:“ He had failed to pinch out the Campiègne buttress on the West…. The tactical success of his own blows had been Ludendorff’s undoing…. He had driven in three great wedges, but none had penetrated far enough to sever a vital artery.” Whether he is describing the strategy of Alexander, Napoleon, or the Battle of the Marne, one of the large combatants may begin to enact, with all the grace of slow-motion photography, a dance of shifting weight dispersed across the lift and fall of giant limbs: He first drew the enemy’s attention and resources to their left flank; then pressed hard on their right and center…he turned to their left, while actually swinging it to their right and center.

It should be stressed that this convention, whether occurring in strategic, military, or political writings, arises not out of any attempt to obscure human hurt but out of purposes appropriate to those writings. The convention expresses the fact that the fate of the coverall army or overall population, and not the fate of single individuals, will determine the outcome; it also has the virtue of bestowing visibility on events which, because of their scale, are wholly outside visual experience. It is, however, a convention which assists the disappearance of the human body from accounts of the very event that is the most radically embodying event in which human beings ever collectively participate .It is not that “injury” is wholly omitted, or even that it is, strictly speaking, redescribed, but rather that it is relocated to a place (the imaginary body of a colossus) where it is no longer recognizable or interpretable. We will respond to the injury (a severed artery in one giant, a massive series of leechbites in another) as an imaginary wound in an imaginary body, despite the fact that that imaginary body is itself made up of thousands of real human bodies, and thus composed of actual (hence woundable) human tissue.

The wound thus becomes a way of articulating and “vivifying” (literally, investing with life) the idea of the strategic vulnerability of an armed forces, and will in most instances, if noticed, be accepted as it is intended, as only a “colorful” form of description: a colossal severed artery, if anything, works to deflect attention away from rather than call attention to what almost, a terrifying number of bodies with actually severed arteries. In fact, when this descriptive convention occurs in close proximity to a sentence referring to actual body damage, it tends to appropriate attention away from  that sentence since it is itself, by its very scale, so visually compelling and, at the same time, so easy to contemplate. Unlike a real wound, it will not, however visually startling, stupefy us into silence or shame us with the shame of our powerlessness to approach the opened human body and make it not opened as before. Describing the first German use of chlorine gas at Ypres on 22 April 1915, Liddell Hart writes that it left a gap four, miles wide “filled only by the dead and by those who lay suffocating in agony from chorine gas-poisoning.” Once sentence later that four-mile-wide gap becomes a gap in the jaw of a giant, and the embodied soldiers are now teeth in that jaw: “ With the aid of gas the Germans had removed the defenders on the north flank of the salient as deftly as if extracting the back teeth from one side of a jaw. The remaining teeth in front and on the south flank of the salient were formed by the Canadian Division (Alderson), nearest the gap, the 28th Division (Bulfin), and the 27th Division (Snow), which together comprised Plumer’s 5th Corps. The Germans had only to push south for four miles to reach Ypres, and loosen all these teeth by pressure from the rear.” Similarly, when in Churchill’s 6 June 1944 address to the House of Commons he announces and assesses the liberation of Rome, he specifies the body count for the two sides as 20,000 and 25,000. But if our attention (or the attention of those originally addressed) does not move to the 45,000 dead it may be because it is still lingering with the striking image that immediately preceded the body count, the image of eight or nine German giants, the eight or nine divisions who were diverted to Italy and “were repulsed, and their teeth broken, by the successful resistance of the Anzio bridgehead forces in the important battle which took place in the middle of February.” The maimed colossus will typically require neither our sympathy nor our anger nor our shame, and it is often, as here, made to look slightly ludicrous in the midst of its mighty catastrophe.

In these first two forms of description, the action of injuring and the injury it accomplishes are invisible, absent from view in the case of omission, and actively escorted out of view in the case of redescription. But they cannot always achieve and maintain invisibility ---there were, for example, at the end of World War I thirty–nine million corpses----and more remarkable, perhaps, than arise once the injuries are seen, and that assign them to an accidental, incidental, or subordinate position: human wounds are not, as earlier, escorted out of view but are instead escorted from the center of view to the margins. There are four main paths by which injuring can be relegated to a still visible but marginal position.

   In the first of these, the injuries and deaths and damage are referred to as a “by-product,” of war: the term is usually preceded by an adjective (“terrible by –product,” “necessary by-product”); which one appears in a given instance is determined by the particular argument that is being made. But if injury is designated “the by –product,” what is the product? Injury is the thing every exhausting piece of strategy and every single weapon is designed to bring into being: it is not something inadvertently produced on the way to producing something else but is the relentless object of all military activity. Although we may become lost in the intricacies of this helicopter’s ability to hover, and that one’s inclusion of a particular type of radar, or the M113’s ability to move over six hundred yards in a given number of seconds less than the M150, what is being indicated at all times is the relative degree of the object’s power to injure (to sight the opponent, to approach and reach the opponent, and to damage the opponent) or the relative degree of its power to remain immune while injuring so that it can go on injuring (hence to sight the opponent, to approach the opponent, to damage the opponent, and to go on damaging the opponent the maximum length of time before it is itself knocked out of the war ). So, too, the complexities of strategic decisions are complexities about where best (not necessarily maximally) and how best (not necessarily maximally) to inflict injury, or where and how to inflict injury while keeping one’s side immune in order to sustain its injury-inflicting powers. It is not the language of “production” or “creation” that is false here, for that vocabulary acknowledges the fact that something not in existence, not naturally occurring, was brought into being by conscious human agency and inventiveness. Nor, if one wanted to include within the production metaphor the goals that are exterior to war (e.g., political freedom, territorial legitimacy, assertion of authority in a given hemisphere) would it be false to designate injury an “intermediate product” that will somehow (that “somehow” will be discussed at a later point) become one day a different product, political, political freedom. But while it is accurate to designate injury the “product” of the immediate activity of war or in this second case, the “intermediate product” in the long-range outcomes, it is in no case accurate to identify it as the by-product. Once may say, for example, that one’s object is to make paper and not to kill trees, but the acres of felled trees are then an intermediate product(actively brought about by concentrated acts of labor), not a by-product.

The language of “by-product” denotes “accidental,” “unwanted,” “unsought,” “unanticipated,” and “useless.” The last meaning is the most crushing, for while the others are only an abdication of responsibility, the last asserts that the deaths on neither side were centrally useful to whatever it was that was being sought through the war’s activity. The only thing more overwhelming than that a human community should have a use for death, the extreme “use for ”that is signaled by the shift from “it is needed ” to “ it is required” ( and soldiers understand that it is this use to which they have been summoned, this to which they have consented: that they are going either “to die for one’s country ” or “ to kill for one’s country”)—the only thing more overwhelming than the fact that it will have this use for death is that the community will then disown that use and designate those deaths “useless.” The millions who stood on the streets of Nagasaki and Dresden, the twenty million Russians who died in World War II, the generation of French and British maimed in World War I, the fifty-seven thousand Americans who died in Vietnam—whatever a war’s use, whatever its aspirations, whatever its accomplishments, its deeds and outcomes, they have nothing central to do with these dead and injured who are war’s by—product.

A second major metaphor again emphasizes the notion of the accidental and unanticipated while moving wholly out of the language of production: here the injuries are seen as having occurred on the road to another goal. While the first vocabulary makes injury the unintentional, outcome in the process of making the second identifies injury as an unforeseeable interruption on the path of arrival. Driving down the road to X (freedom, authority), we suddenly found many people had stepped onto the road (or the road widened and so ran through the filed where they worked) and they were run over. To describe those who die as an “accidental entailment” is as dismissive as to say they are a not particularly useful by-product in the first vocabulary. It is interesting that in the road metaphor, as in the production metaphor, the human mind comes very close to articulating and understanding the nature of injury in war, but then shifts the metaphor so that the very thing that must have been intuited when the mind reached for that metaphor now slips from view. If one is talking of the interior activity of war, then injury is not something on the road to a goal but is the goal itself. If one is including within the road metaphor goals that are exterior to the activity of war (freedom, territorial sovereignty), then it is appropriate to designate these things as the goal or destination beyond injury; but it is crucial to see that, in this use of the metaphor, the injured bodies would nor be something on the road to the goal but would themselves be the road to the goal. If a county’s leaders decide that there is no way reach a desired outcome except by war, they are saying what is said when someone wants to reach a city in a remote geography that is only connected to the individual’s present geography by a single path down which he or she must move. Injured bodies are the material out of which the road is built (and again, we are postponing the question of how the road of injury can end up in the town of freedom, just as it was necessary to postpone the analysis of how injury can be an intermediate product that in a later transformation becomes the final product, freedom). As injured bodies were the product or the intermediate product but not the by-product, so they are the destination at the end of the road or the road across which one can move to a destination, but they are not something that inadvertently stepped onto the road.

The production and road metaphors are described here as though war were a diffuse, global phenomenon; but each of the metaphors works within, and thus can be recognized within, specific descriptions of specific moments in particular wars. The idea of “accidental” injury is omnipresent throughout war descriptions. The spatial metaphor of the road, for example, with its emphasis on accidental entailment or spatial collision, becomes in aerial bombing the unanticipated expansion of the ground included in the bomb’s impact. As one moves from the linear image to the circular one, the goal at the end of the road is the precise point at the center of the circle, and the unintentional swelling of the circle’s circumference to include massive amount of sentient and non-sentient ground. There are endless concrete instances illustrating this habit of mind. In his study of John Kennedy, for example, Theodore Sorensen describes how during the Cuban Missile Crisis military advisors repeatedly named a “surgical strike” as one option, but it eventually became clear that the precision asserted in the word “surgical” was impossible; Kennedy realized that, acting on the military fiction of “surgical strike,” he might have brought about a massive and harrowing catastrophe. Similarly, Michael Walzer reveals that Allied planes during World War II were incapable of targeting their bombs with any more precision than a five –mile radius, yet the misleading term “strategic bombing ”was habitually used and the massive , wide–of–the–mark damage was then designated “unintentional,” even though it was in all instances “foreseeable,” In both these instances, the formal terms used for the bombing, “surgical strike” and “strategic bombing,” already contain within them an anticipatory account of the resulting injuries as beyond the purposes of those doing the bombing. A particularly striking instance of this is the designation of cities, civilians, and economic targets as “indirect targets,” a term whose legitimacy resides in its differentiation of those targets form exclusively military targets (the relentlessly noncivilian entailing battlefields of World War I), yet a term that nevertheless creates the peculiar situation of requiring the agents of the damage to aim directly for the indirect target (bringing about injuries that ,however horrifying, will not be or are not or were not after all precisely the military’s object). These parallel moments have endless equivalents in any military engagement and need not be multiplied here. What is crucial to see is that just as any one form of injury may be understood as having accidentally occurred “on the road” to inflicting injury elsewhere (on the road to injuring soldiers, some civilians were massacred; on the road to injuring civilians, some children were accidentally killed), so all the injuries collectively, those to soldiers, civilians, adults and children alike, are through this metaphor ultimately understood to be injuries that occurred on the noninjuring road to a noninjuring destination.

   A third vocabulary is that of cost: injury is the cost of, to complete the metaphor, the thing that was purchased. This idiom has a great deal in common with the “production” vocabulary, since both belong to the inclusive vocabulary of production and exchange. If one perceives injury as “the intermediate product” that will (once one crosses the boundary of war into the territory of goals external to war) eventually be transformed into the final product, freedom, then “cost” is an almost exact structural equivalent. Just as felled trees are an intermediate product that will be transformed into paper, so one may “make money” (or, for example, make cloth in one’s daily work which is then transformed into money) with which one can then purchase paper. In that purchase, the money has undergone a transformation into the final product: paper. The money, like the trees, is an intermediate product. Thus, as one goes into the cloth factory and makes money that will be transformed into paper, so one goes into war and, makes the injuries that will somehow be transformed into freedom (again this problematic but ultimately valid assertion of transformation will be described later). The idiom is so close to the earlier one that there would be no reason to introduce it as a separate vocabulary here were it not for the fact that its invocation has a characteristic not found in the production metaphor. What typically happens is that injury (and other negative outcomes of war) keeps receding to become the “cost” of a smaller and smaller unit: what one purchases with injury increasingly diminishes. One may begin with the large claim that “war (injury) is the cost of freedom (or better boundaries, or whatever issue the participants believe themselves to be fighting for).” But now the scope of this claim may begin to contract so that “war” itself, first conceived of as the cost, now becomes the thing purchased by, for example, battle. One may turn with dismay from the spectacle of massive injuries and , finding that one has not completely assimilated what one has seen by saying, “War is the cost of freedom,” one now tries again, sighs, and consoles oneself, “Ah well , battle is the cost of war.” The first word in each of the two sentences means “injury,” for this particular construction, “X is the cost of Y,” comes up precisely at the moment when some anguishing spectacle is being adsorbed and explained to oneself or to others. (That is, at times when one is recalling moments of camaraderie, or medical repair, or heroism, one never stops and invokes the construction “X[camaraderie] is the cost of Y.”) But in the second sentence injury has been assigned a smaller place: it is no longer war; it is the cost of war. Now in turn the first term in our second sentence becomes the last term in a third sentence, as in the statement, “Blood is the cost of slaughter.” It is not that any one person moves through the four but that populations as a whole, in their separate murmurings, keep articulating back and forth across their entirety the full series as through to keep the words in the air, to keep them from landing where they can be seen and assessed.

So the cost vocabulary permits and encourages the receding series

War (injury) is the cost of freedom.

Battle (injury) is the cost of war (formerly, injury).

Slaughter (injury) is the cost of battle (formerly, injury).

Blood (injury) is the cost of slaughter (formerly, injury). which not only generates tautology (reading back up through the series, injury is the cost of injury is the cost of freedom; or, with injury one can purchase injury with which one can purchase injury with which one can purchase injury with which one purchase freedom), but does so in such a way that precisely that tautologically self–evident centrality of the act of injuring will itself be steadily minimized. The injury which in the first sentence is recognized as massive (by analogy, the destruction of a city) is folded within itself until by the second construction it seems only the destroyed house within the otherwise standing city, and by the third only a closet within that house, and finally by the fourth a shelf in the closet .It is not that we will cease to perceive and the power of the injury. The wound on the shelf, a damaged head, a torn off arm, an open belly will stare out at the observer by the closet door and flood him with the nausea of awe and terror, overwhelm him, bring him even to his knees as though it were a gun rather than an open gash poised in his direction .But at least he knows that if he could just unfix his gaze, raise or drop his eyes in a small are of vision, there would be other objects on the shelves and other closets and other rooms filled with sunlight and newspapers and a sleeping cat, rather than having to know that the injury is here and there and there and there and everywhere he can turn his eyes, that all the shelves and all the rooms and all the streets up and down the city are covered with blood, slaughter , battle , and war.

   As in this third vocabulary injury may recede further and further from view by being tucked into successively smaller units, so there is a fourth vocabulary that distances the injury by a continual act of extension, as though it were the umbrella on an ever-extending shaft. Injury becomes the extension or continuation of something else that is itself benign. Clausewitz’s famous dictum, “War is the continuation of politics by other means,” achieves its authority and authenticity in the brilliant ease of assertion with which a complicated and elusive phenomenon is suddenly made to stand before one as though it had always been self-evident. Nevertheless, it is a statement which, when cited in isolation, as it so often is, sometimes seems to assert that “war is the continuation of peace (or peacetime activities) by other means” and thus to ally and elide it with a benign activity. Its continuity with peace, the predicate nominative, grammatically dominates the “by other means” of injuring. It would seem that such a dictum would sponsor as its counterpart only delicate parody: Dying is living only different; bleeding is breathing only not exactly. But its equivalent is not in such wistful nonsequiturs but in very serious, often very intelligent if less famous claims. Precisely the same structure, for example, is involved in Liddell Hart’s remarkable definition of military strategy: the aim of strategy, he writes, is to bring about a situation so advantageous “that if it does not itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle will.” This is breathtaking definition: the sentence, in its own elegant turn of thought as well as in its familiar Clausewitzian cadence, may work to suspend critical thought by seeming itself to have carried out the act of thinking so successfully. But it is a statement that though not in itself wrong----it after all summarizes a tradition of strategy----can mislead in a number of directions. Taken literally, it may seem to describe injuring as a failed or lesser form of strategy and thus make the record of twentieth-century slaughter not only a record of what in Clausewitz would be lapsed politics, but what now in Liddell Hart becomes lapsed or inadequate military strategy. Tannenberg, the Marne, Gallipoli, Warsaw cease to be the work of the military and become the failed work or the breakdown of the military. While one can reasonably describe the occurrence of civilian crime---number, rape, theft---as the deterioration of the legal or the police enforcement systems, it is not equally reasonable to understand battle as the dissolution of the military system, as the thing that happened in spite of their presence rather than the fact of the presence itself.

  Although in the immediacy of its enunciation the definition appears to hold ideal military strategy separate from the realm of injury, it may of course be fairly objected that it only works to separate from battle, to separate strategy from reciprocal injuring, and that certainly it assumes the one---directional injuring of capitulation, imprisonment, even physical wounding. The mere fact that an opponent retreats, pulls back, or breaks off the engagement has itself no military advantage, as Clausewitz points out:“ Getting the better of an enemy –that is, placing him in a position where he has to break off the engagement---cannot in itself be considered as an objective [since no one is keeping an abstract score card], and for this reason cannot be included in definition of the objective. Nothing remains, therefore, but the direct profit gained in the process of destruction.” This gain includes not merely the casualties inflicted during the action, but also those which occur as a direct of his retreat. To say that successful strategy is one in which the decision is brought about without a battle is, then, to say that successful strategy is one in which the injuring occurs in only one direction: the lesser or back–up military form (the battle) is one in which the injuring is reciprocal, two directional, and only by one side’s eventually out-injuring the other will battle approximate the perfect case, which is one–directional injuring. Thus, the original definition, which seems to posit noninjuring against injuring, instead posits one-directional injuring against two-directional injuring. If this is what Liddell Hart’s definition meant all along, it is deeply accurate; but it should be noticed that this reformulation has neither the benign sound nor the elegance of the original, and it was certainly for the sake of its benignity and elegance that that formulation was arrived at.

A third way of assessing both the strength and the weakness of the original formulation (which is being used here as a model for the much wider habit of describing wounding as an extension of some more innocent activity) is to attend to the temporal variations that strategy discovers in the act of injuring. A commonly accepted way of understanding what happens in the en of war is to say, as Paul J. Kecskemeti so effectively phrases it, that the participants agree to forgo the next round, that each can imagine the outcome well enough that they need not enact it: one side succumbs. This description applies equally to a unit within war such as a battle: the two sides may forgo the last round, let us say the last five hours of the battle. But this moment of assessment can be pushed back further and further into the battle so that the participants agree to forgo the whole second half of the battle (two days, for example), or the whole last three quarters (three days), until finally we arrive at Liddell Hart’s position: before the battle even begins, the participants access their relative situations and forgo the actual physical locking of arms because the outcome is so clear. Overwhelmed by the display of the opponents’ superior injuring ability, one side surrenders. What it is crucial to see is that can exist between the infliction of injury on an opponent and the opponent’s perception of that infliction of injury. In the situation described here, the perception precedes and anticipates the injury (and modulates the form of but by no means eliminates the fact of the injury since those who surrender do not turn around and go home but are shot or imprisoned). Anticipated injury has surprise injury as its strategic opposite. In the first case, the injury – inflicting capacity of one side is displayed to the other before the actual infliction so that the opponent will capitulate; in the second case the injury–inflicting capacity is kept invisible from the opponent who must not be allowed to see it before it is enacted and ideally will not even see it while it is being enacted (or at least not in the first few minutes in which it is being enacted: there should be at least a few minute lag between the inflicting of injury and the injured side’s awareness that it is being injured), but will only be allowed to see it after it has begun to be enacted . It is important to recognize “anticipated injuring” (in which injury is judged to have the greatest effect if foreseen) and “surprise injuring” (in which injury is judged to have the greatest effect if wholly unforeseen) as counterparts of one another, for it again underscores the fact that a strategy so superb as to eliminate the battle is not a strategy that eliminates injuring but enacts one temporal form of injuring, anticipatory injuring.

The description of the end of war that was transferred to the end of battle and was then pushed back up through the battle’s middle to its beginning may now be retransferred back to the war. There, too, the forgoing of the next round may be pushed back through successive stages until one eliminates battle after battle and at last arrives at a situation where the war itself never starts: each side merely displays their weapons, their injury–inflicting capacities (the arms race), and one side backs down, succumbs to the other before the occurrence of physical damage. It is again crucial to stress that the anticipatory injury is an actual and so forth. If for example, one country were the only country with a nuclear weapon and through that possession required its opponents to capitulate to all its wishes, it would be reciprocal injuring (battle, war) that would have been avoided and replaces not by noninjuring but by one-directional anticipatory injury, This situation would be very different from that in which both sides had equal weapons and both backed away equally, for here the anticipated injury is only anticipatory , imagined and never enacted, since the conflict was averted not by unilateral capitulation but shared retreat. It should also be differentiated from the situation in which neither side has arms, where not only is there no actual physical war, nor the actual injury of capitulation through anticipation, but instead shared rejection of even the display of the capacity to injure: both sides exempt themselves from the contemplation of either wounding or being wounded. The two situations are radically different from that in which a massive inequality of arms is achieved and perpetuated by a solitary country, and the rival country’s ambition for equality of arms is scorned by the first country as war-mongering (a single weapon ensures peace; two bring war) or dismissed as motivated by senseless sibling envy (we have a weapon so now they have to have one too). The dream of an absolute, one-directional capacity to injure those outside one’s territorial boundaries, whether dreamed by a nation-state that is in its interior a democracy or a tyranny, may begin to approach the torturer’s dream of absolute nonreciprocity, the dream that one will be oneself exempt from the condition of being embodied while one’s opponent will be kept in a state of radical embodiment by its awareness that it is at any moment deeply woundable.

The centrality of the act of injuring in war may disappear–the centrality of the human body may be disowned –by any one of six paths. First, it may be omitted from both formal and casual accounts of war. Second, it may instead be redescribed and hence be as invisible as if omitted: live tissue may become minimally animate (vegetable) or inanimate (metal) material, exempt from the suffering that live sentient tissue must bear; or the conflation of animate and inanimate vocabularies may allow alterations in the metal to appropriate all attention, as in the designation of “disarming” as central; or the concept of injury may be altered by relocating the injury to the imaginary body of a colossus. Third, it may be neither omitted nor redescribed and instead acknowledge to be actual injury occurring in the sentient tissue of the human body, but now held in a visible but marginal position by four metaphors that designate it the by—product, or something on the road to a goal, or something continually folded into itself as in the cost vocabulary, or something extended as a prolongation of some other more benign occurrence.

Crucial to the analysis that follows is not the intricacy of the paths by which it disappears but the much simpler and more fundamental fact that injuring is, in fact, the central activity of war .Visible or invisible, omitted, included, altered in its inclusion, described or redescribed, injury is war’s product and its cost, it is the goal toward which all activity is directed and the road to the goal, it is there in the smallest enfolded corner of war’s interior recesses and still there where acts are extended out into the largest units of encounter. As a major premise of the analysis, the centrality of injury is an extremely modest premise because it is self-evident and so elementary that it is itself another to an array of intricate and morally sophisticated questions often asked about war that will not even be touched on here. Bertrand Russell, for example, calls attention to the morally problematic human habit of saying, “I am going off to die for my country” rather than acknowledging that “I am going off to kill for my country” just as Mouloud Feraoun summarizes the universal self-description of all participants in war: “defending a just cause, killing for a just cause, and risking an unjust death.” But in the present discussion, it is not the different distinctions among these phrases that will be attended to but only their common denominator that will from this point forward be assumed. Whether a boy announces that he is going off “to die” for his country or going off “to kill” for his country, he is saying that he is going off “to alter body tissue “(either his own or another’s) for his country, and the eventual destination here is to understand the structural logic of an event in which alterations in human tissues can come to be the freedom or ideological autonomy or moral legitimacy of a country. For now, it is only the centrality of injuring that is designated given. “War kills; that is all it does,” writes Michael Walzer in the midst of a complex analysis of just and unjust wars. “Being shelled is the main work of the infantry soldier,” writes Louis Simpson about World War II; “Everyone has his own way of going about it. In general, it means lying down and contracting your body in as small a apace as possible ” Though this premise may be disowned in endless ways, it may also be renowned, both by looking directly at a war and by looking at the echo of words of those who have looked, moral philosopher, foot soldier, poet, strategist, general, painter. “But see,” begins Leonardo da Vinci in the last sentence of his long instruction to painters on how to represent a battle, a verbal treatise that creates a large visual canvas of dust and sun and horse bodies and human bodies, faces in physical pain and faces drawn in exhaustion ----“But see,” he at last concludes, bringing the long rush of instructions to a sudden halt, “see that you make no level spot of ground that is not trampled over with blood.”

War is relentless in taking for its own interior content the interior content of the wounded and open human body.

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